Abstract-The open, sharing and anonymous nature of peer-to-peer (P2P) network has offered opportunities and threats for the development of distributed computing technology. One feasible way to minimize threats is to establish the reputation-based global trust model. Most of current trust mechanisms are not only unable to restrain effectively such malicious behavior as collusive attacks, but also take no consideration for the security of the trust management. As for these problems, this paper proposes a secure and effective reputation based distributed P2P global trust management model (DSRM), and presents its corresponding distributed storage mechanism of reputation information, and security protection protocol. Theoretical analysis and simulation experiments show that, DSRM has advantages in combating various malicious behaviors such as ordinary malicious behaviors and collusions, and suppressing the sybil attackers and trust information tamper peers in transmission over the current global trust management models, and demonstrates more robustness and effectiveness.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, pee-to-peer (P2P) computing has achieved its popularity in many distributed applications, including file-sharing, digital content delivery, and P2P Grid computing [1] . However, peer anonymity and autonomy make P2P networks quite vulnerable to attacks by selfish and malicious peers. Previous work [2] [3] [4] [5] shows that we can utilize the trust theory in social networks to construct reputation-based trust models, to suppress effectively these malicious behaviors.
Most of the existing reputation-based trust models compute the trusted rank of one peer based on its transaction histories with others, and it is very likely that the peer with the highest trust value is looked on as the service provider. To a certain degree, this approach has some effects on the simple malicious behavior patterns, but shows little effect in dealing with the complex attacks and disturbance activities on reputation systems, such as collusions. Besides, most of current researches concentrate on the design and implementation of the trust system, and pay less attention to the security problem confronted by its reputation management. In fact, security of reputation management is the key element assuring the normal running of the trust management system (TMS), and is as important as any other element of the reputation management. Thus, it is necessary to discuss and analyze the security mechanism of the TMS in this paper.
With these research problems in mind, we propose a reputation based distributed P2P trust model integrated with the security mechanism for the reputation information management (DSRM), for P2P networks, and give the corresponding Terrace-based [2] distributed storage scheme and the security protocol for protecting the distributed reputation information of the TMS. Simulation experiments exhibit DSRM not only can restrain behaviors of the simple malicious peers and collusive peers, but also can counter many attacks concerning security to TMS, such as sybil attacks and reputation information tamper attacks in transmission, etc. The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows: Section II reviews the related work. Section III formally introduces our trust model DSRM without security mechanism. Section IV provides its distributed storage mechanism and the security requirements of the reputation management. Section V describes the related security protocol for assuring the security of the reputation management. Section VI simulates and discusses DSRM. Finally, we conclude the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
We can classify the trust model into two categories, the trust model which relies on the 3 rd party and that independent of the 3 rd party. The representative of the former is the PKI-based trust model [6] . In this system, one or several power peers take charge of a set of trusted peers, and these power peers can issue certificates to newly-joined trusted peers. The certificate is used as the warrant for consuming the network resource. However, this kind of system is usually center-dependent, which is not in accordance with the nature of P2P networks, and has the risk of single points of failure. The trust model independent of the 3 rd party can be categorized into two kinds, including the micro-payment based model [7] and the social trust network based model. The former model takes the virtual money as the means of service exchanges, needing some monitoring system to trace each small transaction process, and is not feasible in actual engineering applications.
We can sort the model based on the social trust network into the local trust model and the global trust model. In the local trust model, a peer determines the trustworthiness of one peer by converging the feedbacks through retrieving some limited other neighbor peers, and its direct interaction experiences with this peer. However, this system gets feedbacks only through broadcasting locally, and these feedbacks are local and partial [2] . On the contrary, the global trust model gets the unique global reputation information of one peer through the iterative computation of satisfactory ratings between neighbor participants. Usually, the global trust value of an arbitrary peer is determined by two parts: the local reputation ratings from the peers, which have ever transacted with this peer, and these peers' global trust values. The reputation management in EigenTrust [4] and PeerTrust [5] largely pay attention to the efficient and reliable requirements of reputation storage and access, on the basis of DHT topology, but neglect the security demand for the reputation management.
Besides the studies for the reputation based trust model, some researchers have studied the security mechanism of the reputation information management related tightly with the trust model. Reference [8] provides an enhanced security transmission protocol for trust management. It uses random numbers to suppress the replay attack, and utilizes digital signature algorithm to assure the integrity and consistency of reputation information. However, its public key is transmitted in unsecure channel. What's more, its response packets are transmitted back by the reverse sequence, and any peer in its path can launch the man-in-the-middle attack.
In Reference [9] , each peer only stores its direct interactive experience, used for other peers' lookup. Simultaneously, To prevent the information from being tampered with deliberately, it uses such security mechanism as encryption and digital signature scheme to consist a deletion and tamper-proof information chain, the head of which is decided by the peer itself. Additionally, Reference [10] puts forward its security message transmission protocol in Web of Trust based distributed reputation system OpenPrivacy.
Based on the analysis for the current trust management mechanisms, Reference [11] argues that it is a required feature for the anonymity to prevent the archive peers from being attacked by malicious the peers in trust management. Therefore, this literature proposes a reputation information management mechanism with anonymity nature TrustMe, based on public-key cryptography. Its basic idea is like this: it makes use of its own security infrastructure to assure the anonymity characteristic in accessing the reputation information, and protect the reputation information management mechanism, by introducing a boostrapping server (BS). Based on the security mechanism in TrustMe, Reference [12] offers a DHT-based distributed trust management mechanism RepMan, in which a security assuring protocol based on BS and public-key encryption scheme is used to assure the efficiency in accessing trust information , and the security and reliability for the TMS. However, there are some weaknesses as follow:
(1) Like TrustMe, RepMan also takes BS as the trust management infrastructure, which is equivalent to the Certification Authority (CA). It is center-dependent, which can achieve less scalability, and has the risk of single points of failure, just like PKI.
(2) The encryption scheme and the identity authentication is too complicated, and it is hard to cope with the overhead tradeoff between the TMS and the security protocol, since it will increase greatly the extra running cost and overhead for the TMS. Thereby, we deem that it is more instructive in theoretic references than in real engineering applications.
With respect to the sybil attack problem, Reference [2] gives an authentication method Cent IP-ID , which matches the peer's IP address with its identifier to find its real identity. This method assumes that peer u and peer v know the IP address of each other (supposed IP u and IP v ) in advance, but the identity verification process is implemented between peer u and peer v's archive peer D v (we will give the definition of archive peer in Section IV). However, in terms of the anonymity feature of Terrace storage mechanism, peer u has no idea of peer D v ' IP address IP Dv . Moreover, as a normal user peer, peer D v probably has not ever interacted with peer u, so it also may have no knowledge of peer u's IP address IP u . Therefore, the true effect of Cent IP-ID in reality needs further verifications.
III. REPUTATION BASED TRUST MODEL
Firstly, the definitions of the satisfactory degree evaluation and the direct trust value are given, and then we define the global trust value (GTV). Definition 1 Reputation ratings. After transacting with each other, one peer i (the service consumer) will submit its ratings of satisfactory degree to the other peer j (the service provider), which can be defined as the following map function ( , ) f i j :
in which, each time peer i consumes the service from peer j normally, it may rate the transaction as positive (1), otherwise, as negative (-1).
Therefore, during the time fraction t (t is decided by the concrete application. For example, six months), the reputation ratings peer i puts to peer j can be defined as
, which can be expressed by another formula: 
Unsat
represent the numbers of satisfactory and unsatisfactory transactions peer i has had with peer j, respectively. Definition 2 Direct trust value. In order to aggregate local trust values and describe the real local trust value more precisely, it is necessary to normalize them in some manner, ensuring that all values will be between 0 and 1. Thus, we can define the direct trust value peer i assigns to peer j as follows:
where, ε denotes the lowest trust threshold.
Definition 3
In the network N, the GTV of an arbitrary peer i (denoted T i ) is defined in (4) .
where, K denotes the peer set which consists of peers, who have ever interacted with peer i, and offered feedbacks to it. Assuming the GTV vector is
, , ,
T n T T T T =
, then the matrix form of (4) is as follows:
(5) in which, R is the direct trust value given in Definition 2. The iterative convergence feature of (5) determines whether we can get the computation results of the GTV vector T. In fact, we can utilize the Jacobi iterative approach to prove the fact that we can get the needed iterative results from (5). Here, we omit the proof details, and the interested readers can refer to related literatures.
IV. REPUTATION INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SECURI-TY REQUIREMENTS
As for the reputation information management, firstly, we provide the distributed storage mechanism of the reputation information. Secondly, we analyze the security requirements of the reputation information management, and finally we present a security protocol to protect the reputation information management.
A. Distributed Storage Mechanism of Reputation Information
Based on the Terrace topology proposed in Reference [2] , we construct a DSRM-oriented distributed storage mechanism of the reputation information. Terrace, a DHT-based structured topology, can be used as the underlying infrastructure of the trust management, providing necessary trust assurances to the above structured or unstructured P2P applications. Terrace takes advantage of the approach of the uni-hash function, meaning a peer participates in this topology with a random logical address, which can assure the security of the anonymous storage of the reputation information.
In detail, as to DSRM, the relevant information for reputation computation of a peer is stored into its corresponding logical peer. Through a even hash function (for example, SHA-1) HDT, We can map the identifier of peer i to the logical address (supposed d) of a certain peer in Terrace tree, and the process is d=HTD(ID i ). The peer in Terrace tree, whose address is d, is named archive peer. Each archive peer, whose logical address is d, at least includes such a data structure as Table I .
In Table I 
B. Running Process and Security Requirements of Trust Management Model
The design of the security mechanism of the distributed trust management is tightly related with the running process of the corresponding TMS. Thus, before discussing the security requirements of the trust management of the TMS, we analyze the running process of the TMS when it is deployed into P2P networks, and its classic process is demonstrated as shown in Fig. 1 .
At first, we show the notations used in this section: we use symbol i, j and k to represent the service requesting peer, the service response peer and the archive peer of the service response peer, respectively.
Step1. peer i searches the needed service via the specified inquiry mechanism (a), and receives the corresponding the response of the available service response peer j (b);
Step2. peer i sends the inquiry request of the trust value to peer j's archive peer k (c), and receive peer k's feedbacks (d);
Step3. In light of the service choosing policy (for example, choose the peer with the highest trust value as the service provider), peer i chooses peer j as the service provider, and send back the confirmation message (e). Thus, it begins to consume the service (for example, download some files) (f);
Step4. After the transaction, based on the satisfactory degree to the service, peer i submits the reputation ratings to peer k (g).
In the above process, the operations related to the reputation information storage, access and transmission include process c, d and g. In process c, peer i sends the inquiry request of peer j's GTV to peer k, in process d, process d returns the GTV of peer j to peer i, and in process g, peer i submits the reputation ratings to peer k. Therefore, the real operations about the reputation information only include process d and process f. Concretely, the security risks existing in the above global trust model are as follow:
(1) Impersonation peer problem Peers in P2P networks are strange to each other. To reach the aim of successful transaction, one peer should Figure 1 . The running process of TMS be able to recognize and validate the other's real identity, prevent impersonation peers and unauthorized peers accessing. In the trust management, the peer with lower GTV can impersonate the identity of the peer with higher GTV to endanger the TMS: (1) The sybil attacker imposes negative effect on some peers' GTV by deceiving these peers' archive peers, and (2) provides malicious services to others as the identity of the norm peer.
(2) Reputation information tamper problem in transmission
In terms of the above analysis, we know that, in the running process of the TMS, the reputation information (GTV or the reputation ratings) will transmit between peers, which needs the support of the underlying network infrastructure. The reputation information is possibly intercepted and tapered with by the malicious 3 rd party without any security mechanism, which will destroy the integrity of the reputation information, and even compromise the availability and effectiveness of the TMS itself. Thus, we should integrate some security mechanism to protect the transmitted reputation information.
V. SECURITY PROTOCOL
The goal to design the security protocol is to provide security assurances for the reputation information access and transmission in the TMS. To get rid of the center-dependent feature of symmetric key scheme, this paper also introduces public-key cryptography as the security infrastructure. Assuming each peer in the P2P network has a public and private key pair (KU i , KR i ), in which, KR i is kept secretly by peer i, and KU i is issued publicly over the network, and all other peers can get it by accessing peer i's archive peer.
Before describing the security protocol of the trust management, we give the meanings of the symbols used in this section, as shown in Table II .
A. Sybil Attacker Preventing Mechanism
We capitalize on the public key scheme as the basis of the identity authentication. Since we have not introduced the trusted 3 rd party as the verification infrastructure, the authentication mechanism becomes relatively complex. According to our above assumption that each peer's private key is stored into the peer itself, and the public key is stored into its archive peer. Therefore, we can take advantage of this assumption, to establish a challenge-response protocol, whose processes are illustrated in Fig. 2 We can impose severe punishment mechanisms to the sybil peer: set its trust value to the lowest threshold, or drop all connections with it, and banish it out from the P2P network.
B. Tamper-Proof Mechanism in Reputation Information Transmission
As analyzed in Section IV, to obtain the GTV of the response peer, the request peer has to send inquiry request to the archive peer of the response peer, and the archive peer returns the needed information. After the transaction, the request peer needs to submit the reputation ratings to the archive peer. All the reputation information interacting processes need to be implemented via the reputation information transmission in the channels among peers. Furthermore, the reputation information is transmitted with the format of plain text, which is easily intercepted and tampered with by other malicious peers. In order to prevent this situation, we present a scheme composed of the public-key system based digital signature and the message digest algorithm, to assure the integrity of reputation information in transmission. We assume there are two peers, such as peer i and peer j, and they are the sender and the receiver, respectively. We can use RSA or EIGamal as the digital signature algorithm, and MD5 or SHA-1 as the message digest algorithm. In detail, this mechanism can be described as follow:
(
1) i: SIG i (TS i , H(TInformaiton))+ TInformation
IP ⎯⎯ → j Step1. Peer i copes with the trust information TInformation with SHA-1, and gets the corresponding message digest information H(TInformaiton) (a);
Step2. On obtaining the message digest information, peer i generates current time stamp TS i . After that, it signs the information composed of the message digest information and TS i , with its private key SIG i (TS i 
Step3. Combining the information signed in Step2 and the trust information in the format of plain text to the mixed information SIG i (TS i , H(TInformaiton))+ TInformation, and sending it peer j (c);
(2) j: DP KUi (SIG i 
(TS i , H(TInformaiton)))
Step4. After receiving the information sent in Step3, peer j separates the information, and gets the information SIG i (TS i , H(TInformaiton)) signed in Step2 and the plain trust information TInformation. After that, peer j obtains peer i's public key by inquiring peer i's archive peer D i , decrypts the signed message digest DP KUi (SIG i (TS i , H(TInformaiton))), and get the primitive message digest
Step5. Peer j processes the plain trust information gained in Step4 with the same hash function as used in Step1, and gets the resulting message digest H(TInformaiton) (e); Step6. Finally, peer j compares the message digest obtained in Step4 with that in Step5. If the result is unequal, peer j can conclude that the trust information has been tampered with or destroyed in transmission, and the transmitted information is useless. Thus, peer j can require peer i to re-submit the needed trust information. Otherwise, peer j can regard the received trust information as the useful information (f).
In the above process, the processes from Step1 to Step3 are executed in the sender i (see Fig. 3 ), while the processes from Step4 to Step6 are implemented in the receiver j (see Fig. 4 ). In addition, we can see that the above security mechanism has not implemented the confidential function, and the reason is that it is unnecessary to hide the content of the trust information in transmission, which is open to all peers in the P2P network. Moreover, the proposed security mechanism not only has the integrity verification function of the trust information, but also has the identity authentication and non-repudiation functions.
VI. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We apply the file sharing application as the simulation case. The simulation setup is as follows: The community consists of 1000 peers. We allocate 10000 files into each peer with even random probability distribution, and the detailed simulation setting is shown in Table III . In simulation, assuming that all the files can be located successfully, that each file is possessed by at least one normal peer, and that the newly joined peer has a probability of 10% to be chosen as the service provider. Here, we simulate 100 query cycles, and each peer can execute transactions for 100 times.
To compare, we simulate EigenTrust trust model at the same time. In addition, we also simulate the P2P network without deploying any trust system, in which each peer chooses randomly the service provider to download the needed resource every time (denoted NoTrust). The evaluation standard is the successful transaction rate (STR), which is described as the percentage of the number of successful transactions with respect to the total transaction number. The index intuitively reflects the applying effect of the trust model. The hardware platform of simulation consists of CPU for AMD Athlon™ 64 X2 Dual 1.9GHZ, and the memory of 1GMB, and the simulation software is developed in Java. 
A. Behavior Pattern Definition
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of DSRM to suppress the attacks of malicious peers, we design several malicious behavior patterns as follow:
The simply malicious peer, being the basic type of malicious peer, only provides malicious uploading service, which is named SMS for short. The collusive malicious peers are organized into a group, which give exaggerated ratings and highly trusted services to members within the group, and denigrated ratings and malicious services to members outside the group. We named this type of peer as CM. The sybil attacker impersonates the peer with higher GTV, denigrates this peer, and offer dishonest services to others, which can be represented as SA.
B. SMS Simulation and Discussion
This experiment is mainly used to test the effectiveness of DSRM confronted with different scale of SMS peers. For comparison, we also make simulations for EigenTrust and NoTrust under the same environments. As demonstrated in Fig. 5 , as there is no malicious peer in the system, their initial STRs all can reach as high as 98%. With the percentage of SMS peers increasing, the curve for NoTrust drops fastest, and when its percentage gets to 50%, its STR drops only to about 20%. As to the other two models, the STR for DSRM decreases a little, while that for EigenTrust declines sharply. As the percentage of SMS peers goes up to 50%, the STR for EigenTrust is no more than 50%, but the same index for DSRM is about 70%. The results exhibit that it is effective for our DSRM to suppress malicious behaviors of SMS peers.
C. CM Simulation and Discussion
CM peers are familiar with each other in their group, and they may collaborate with each other to boost up their own ratings. Concretely, they may rate the peers in their collusion group very high and rate outsiders very low. This type of malicious peers will produce more threats to the trust model itself. From Fig. 6 , we can see that CM peers can easily obtain a higher trust value with the increase of CM peers. Due to lack of effective punishment mechanisms for CM peers in EigenTrust, the STR for EigenTrust decreases greatly, while DSRM can effectively cope with the malicious behaviors of CM peers, and keep the STR in a higher level. As shown in Fig. 6 , as the percentage of CM peers increase to 50%, the STR for DSRM still can reach as high as 68%. However, the counterpoint for EigenTrust is only 35%. The above simulation results prove that DSRM can show more effectiveness and robustness against the malicious behaviors of CM peers.
D. SA Simulation And Discussion
To test the effect of the security protocol in DSRM, we simulate DSRM without integrating any security mechanism (supposed GPTM) and EigenTrust simultaneously under the same experimental circumstances. When receiving the inquiry requests from other peers, the SA peer always disguises the peer with higher GTV to respond these requests, and tries to entice these peers to submit unsatisfactory ratings to the real peer, by providing unreliable services to these peers, resulting in lots of unsatisfactory ratings in the trust system. Based on the knowledge, we suppose SA peers always respond the inquiry requests with the frequency of 1.5-2.5 times higher than the norm trusted peers, and launch the sybil attacks. We observe varying tendency of STR with the scale of SA peers changing, and the simulation results are shown in Fig. 7 .
As shown in Fig. 7 , with the number of SA peers increasing, the STRs for GPTM and for EigenTrust both decrease to a certain extent. When the percentage of SA peers reaches 30%, the STRs for GPTM and for EigenTrust are 74% and 55%, respectively. However, when the percentage of SA peers reaches as high as 50%, the corresponding STRs are 66% and 43%, respectively. This is because no sybil attack preventing mechanisms are integrated into EigenTrust, leading to the obviously negative effect on the STR from SA peers. Moreover, there is similar situation existing in GPTM, which shows the fact that SA peers will significantly compromise DSRM, if no security mechanisms are deployed into it. However, as for DSRM, since we apply the security defense mechanism to SA peers, the sybil attack problem can be tackled perfectly. Thus, as demonstrated in Fig. 7 , except the unconspicuous service failure due to the interior unreliable behaviors in DSRM, SA peers cannot do any harm to it.
E. Efficiency of the Security Protocol in DSRM
In order to observe that, when the security protocol is deployed into DSRM, how much it has influence the whole trust management system without any security mechanism, we assume 30% of peers in the P2P network are SMS peers. Under this condition, we do two simulation experiments: one is executed under the circumstances of DSRM, and the other is carried out under the circumstances of GPTM. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 8 . Fig. 8 compares the varying tendency of STR over time, from which, we can see these two types of TMSs can effectively recognized SMS peers, though there is little differences for the recognizing effect. After around 280ms, GPTM can absolutely distinguish the "good peers" from the SMS peers, leading to the stable STR in Fig. 8 , while DSRM needs more time (roughly 390ms) to achieve the same level. The reason is that once the security protocol integrated into DSRM is initiated, the running processes of the identity authentication mechanism and the reputation information tamper proof mechanism in transmission both need to consume some time. The time gap is about 110ms, which is a very little gap for the real engineering applications. The results illuminate that the time overhead of the security protocol proposed in this paper is very little. Therefore, this security protocol shows better efficiency, and is feasible to be applied to the real engineering environments. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The authenticity of the reputation information is the basis of assuring the normal running of TMS. After analyzing the security risks existing in the current TMS, this paper proposes a reputation based secure and distributed trust management model, and gives the corresponding reputation information storage mechanism and security defense protocol. The security protocol is used to cope with the sybil attack problem and the reputation information tamper problem in transmission. Analysis and simulation results show, in contrast with the current global trust models, that the proposed model is more robust and effective on attacks from various malicious peers, including peers with malicious behaviors and peers with security threats, and shows more improvements in the security feature of the trust management. Additionally, the security protocol is feasible to be deployed into the real engineering applications associated with the trust management.
